THE RULE OF LAW: LIMITS AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS. Lessons from the Peruvian case
Boundaries establish order. In personal relationships, they foster respect; in relations between states, they define sovereignty and prevent undue interference. Conversely, if boundaries are not established in good time, there is a risk of becoming trapped in abusive relationships which, once entrenched, prove very difficult to change. As the saying goes: ‘A tree that grows crooked cannot be straightened’. Every person, just like every country, needs to set their boundaries in order to protect themselves. And the metaphor explains it well: a crooked trunk, already hardened by time, can hardly be straightened without breaking irreparably. Similarly, any imbalance that is not corrected from the outset tends to become entrenched and persist.
In the political sphere, it is easy to see how the absence of limits leads to abuse of authority and crises of governance. It was precisely because of this problem that the idea of the rule of law emerged. And on this point, it is worth highlighting the work of Montesquieu, particularly *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), in which he developed one of the most influential treatises on the limitation of power.
Montesquieu did not place complete trust in the ‘goodness’ of people, for even the most benevolent individual can change when there are no limits. His reflection led him to conclude that, when a single person concentrates power, they may become arbitrary; lacking any checks, they may be inclined towards abuse (Montesquieu, C., 1748). The author had a deep understanding of human nature, and therefore considered it necessary to create systems capable of curbing its excesses.
In this regard, he proposed a model in which power was neither absolute nor concentrated, but rather distributed and restrained. Hence his famous statement: ‘so that power may not be abused, it is necessary that power should restrain power’ (Montesquieu, C., 1748). His theory helped shape the famous rule of law, which is currently practised in democratic states.
Regrettably, democracy is currently showing signs of decline, and this reality is reflected in various contexts across Latin America, where the excessive concentration of power in certain institutions has undermined the stability of the state – a phenomenon observed when certain institutions accumulate authority without checks and balances (ECLAC, 2020). In this context, the case of Peru is particularly illustrative.
From 2016 to 2026, Peru has had more than seven presidents: Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Martín Vizcarra, Manuel Merino, Francisco Sagasti, Pedro Castillo, Dina Boluarte and José Jerí – the latter being the most recently deposed president, who held office for no more than five months. This rapid turnover highlights the fragility of the political system and the lack of clear boundaries in the relationship between the executive and the legislature.
The Peruvian Congress has repeatedly resorted to mechanisms for presidential removal from office, relying on legal interpretations such as ‘moral incapacity’. In this regard, many politicians and media outlets maintain that this Congress wields a high level of power and that, in practice, it appears to be unchecked (Chávez J., 2026).
From a constitutional perspective, a system of checks and balances between the branches of the Peruvian state does exist; however, the checks on Congress are predominantly political and lack technical or institutional counterbalances that would effectively limit its actions.
From a management perspective, this problem can be understood as a disconnect between operational capacity and the control mechanisms inherent in good governance. In any organisation, when the implementation of decisions is not accompanied by effective systems of supervision and evaluation, imbalances arise that affect its functioning. Something similar occurs at the political level: when the legislative branch exercises its functions without effective institutional checks and balances, disorder ensues and consistent progress is not made.
According to Fiorela Marín (2026), in her work ‘Presidential removal from office on grounds of permanent moral incapacity in Peru: a constitutional analysis and case study on its political use’, Congress has repeatedly used this mechanism as a means of discretionary political control. Based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of various removal proceedings, a pattern was identified in the reinterpretation of constitutional provisions to remove presidents without clearly defined objective criteria or comprehensive mechanisms of legitimisation, which has contributed to institutional instability and the weakening of the balance of powers.
The Peruvian Constitution provides for removal from office on grounds of permanent moral incapacity, but does not precisely define its scope. This ambiguity has allowed for broad interpretations by Congress, which, whilst acting within a formally legal framework, can extend its powers beyond the intended balance of powers.
The evidence provided by Marín (2026) shows that when a framework (be it constitutional, institutional or even social) is altered or expanded beyond its original intent, imbalances arise that are difficult to correct. Power that lacks checks and balances expands, becomes distorted and ultimately affects the entire system, jeopardising stability and governability.
This is demonstrated by the Peruvian case: from 2016 onwards, a series of presidential impeachments began, revealing that these were no longer isolated incidents but a recurring pattern, within a legislative landscape where the political forces themselves appeared to have normalised such decisions. In this regard, a valid concern arose, as many of these figures stood as candidates once again in the recent elections, raising the possibility that the same political dynamics might persist or be repeated.
In comments reported by a Peruvian newspaper in the run-up to the recent elections, a former minister stated that “the parties in Congress hold power, and for this reason they should not be re-elected” (Chávez J., 2026). This observation is valuable as it is grounded in the experience and perspective of someone who has been directly involved in public administration; however, beyond individual positions, it is necessary to deepen the analysis of the need to promote viable constitutional changes aimed at strengthening the mechanisms of checks and balances between the branches of government, so that they may be sustainable over time.
Otherwise, the situation currently seen in Congress would be repeated. It is not enough to seek a solution to a specific problem; rather, it is essential to interpret the Constitution in its entirety and recognise its gaps, whilst also assessing whether the procedure applied is the most appropriate and what its effects might be. As indicated in the journalistic analysis ‘(E)moción de vacancia’ (Vergara, A., 2025), the use of these mechanisms may stem more from political impulses than from sound institutional reasoning. Without proper analysis, decisions may be driven by immediate interests or even good intentions, but will ultimately exceed their original purpose and generate instability.
The rule of law is often identified with the existence of three separate branches of government. However, Montesquieu’s (1748) contribution did not consist solely of dividing power, but of designing a system in which each branch could check the excesses of the others.
Peru is a state governed by the rule of law, but when the legislature can remove the executive so easily, the balance is disrupted: power is no longer constrained and instability ensues. This imbalance, so clearly evident, is one of the most extreme cases of political instability in the region. Whilst other countries such as Brazil, Paraguay or Ecuador have faced occasional removals from office, in Peru the pace and frequency of these changes stand out for their speed and persistence. Each removal further warps the ‘democratic trunk’, which was not designed to bend, but to stand firm. Democracy, in its original design, seeks to guarantee stability, limits and control, especially in contexts of high institutional fragility.
When we respect the limits and original designs, we maintain balance, stability and harmony; when we alter them, systems tend to become distorted and spiral out of control. This principle should serve as a parallel for much of what we deal with in social, political and personal spheres.
By Pamela Alcázar, writer and international analyst, with a background in International Relations and Administration. She is currently studying for a Master’s degree in Governance and Human Rights at the Autonomous University of Madrid.
This article was selected as part of the Call for Papers by FIBGAR’s ALERTA Latam Observatory, aimed at students on the Master’s in Governance and Human Rights at the Autonomous University of Madrid. We thank the author for her valuable contribution to this forum for analysis and critical reflection on the challenges facing Latin America, and for her commitment to promoting human rights, justice and democracy in the region.
REFERENCES
1. Aragon, J., Cruz, M., Alcántara, K., & Sánchez, P. (2024). Congressional power in Peru: a mid-term review of the 2021–2026 term. School of Government and Public Policy, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru.
2. Marín, F. R. (2026). Presidential removal from office on grounds of permanent moral incapacity in Peru: a constitutional analysis and case study of its political use. InveCom Journal, 6(4), 1–8. National University of San Agustín – Arequipa. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18612853
3. Montesquieu. (1748). The Spirit of the Laws.
4. Chávez Cardoza, J. (25 March 2026). Salvador del Solar urges voters not to vote for any party in the current Congress: “They have a stranglehold on power”. La República. https://larepublica.pe/politica/2026/03/25/salvador-del-solar-pide-no-votar-por-ningun-partido-del-actual-congreso-ellos-tienen-controlado-el-poder-hnews-1451250
5. Vergara, A. (12 October 2025). (E)motion for removal from office. El País. https://elpais.com/america/2025-10-12/emocion-de-vacancia.html
6. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (2020). Report on Governance and Democracy in Latin America. United Nations.
