The Assembly of States Parties faces a historic decision: a decisive moment for international criminal justice
Today, 24 July 2026, the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute is meeting in an extraordinary session at the United Nations headquarters in New York to decide on the possible removal of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Karim A. A. Khan KC.
This is an unprecedented situation – as, for the first time since the Court’s creation, the States Parties must decide on the removal of a sitting Prosecutor – and it comes at a particularly challenging time for international criminal justice.
The ICC is going through a period marked by mounting political pressure, questions about its legitimacy and targeted attacks against its officials and those cooperating with its investigations. Consequently, although the vote formally concerns an individual disciplinary proceeding, its implications go beyond the specific situation of the Prosecutor and affect the institutional model established by the Rome Statute.
An exceptional disciplinary proceeding
The proceedings before the Assembly today stem from allegations of sexual misconduct made against Karim Khan in 2024 by a staff member of the Office of the Prosecutor.
The allegations of misconduct against him were first reported, via a third party, to the Court’s Internal Oversight Mechanism (IOM) in May 2024, and were made public on 24 October of that same year. According to media reports, the allegations include sexual harassment of a female staff member who worked directly under his supervision in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), non-consensual sexual touching, coercive sexual behaviour, abuse of authority, and reprisals against OTP staff who reported these incidents.
On 18 October 2024, the IOM reported that the alleged victim had declined to file a formal complaint and had refused to confirm or deny the allegations, and therefore considered that it was not necessary to open an investigation. On 28 October, Khan himself asked the IOM to launch an immediate investigation into the allegations and the circumstances surrounding them, and continued to repeatedly deny the veracity of these accusations. On 6 November, the IOM informed the ASP Bureau that it would have no objection to an external investigation, given the potential perceptions of a conflict of interest and out of respect for the victim’s wishes. Following this, the Presidency of the ASP commissioned the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to conduct an external investigation, under what the Presidency itself described as a “victim-centred approach”. Neither the exact terms of reference nor the scope of that investigation have been made public.
Once the OIOS investigation was concluded, an ad hoc panel with an advisory mandate, comprising three judges, was tasked with providing advice on the legal characterisation of the facts set out in the OIOS report. In March 2026, that Panel concluded, unanimously and applying the standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, that the facts established by the investigation did not constitute misconduct or a breach of duty under the Court’s legal framework. The Panel’s report has not been published.
Despite the Panel’s conclusion, the Bureau of the ASP — comprising 21 diplomatic representatives — decided, by a qualified majority and in a split vote, not to follow that recommendation. The Court’s regulatory framework permits this course of action: where the Panel concludes that there was no serious misconduct, but the Bureau disagrees and considers that there was, it may refer the case to the plenary Assembly for possible dismissal (Rule 82(2)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the ASP). The Bureau therefore agreed to: refer the disciplinary proceedings to the Assembly; suspend Mr Khan from his duties with immediate effect — a precautionary measure that does not constitute a sanction, does not prejudge the outcome, and does not affect his salary — and convene a Special Session ‘as soon as possible’.
On 18 June 2026, it was announced that this session would be held on 24 July of the same year at the UN Headquarters in New York, for logistical reasons: all 125 States Parties are represented there, including three that have notified their withdrawal from the Court but retain their voting rights for the one-year period during which that procedure is ongoing.
The Assembly decides by secret ballot and an absolute majority of the States Parties (Article 46(2)(b) of the Rome Statute). If the Assembly votes in favour of removal from office, this takes effect immediately and Khan is barred from participating in any ongoing cases. If it votes against removal, the matter is referred back to the Bureau, which must impose a disciplinary measure proportionate to the seriousness of the facts it determines; this does not, however, amount to an exoneration of Khan, as the Assembly does not rule on the substance of the allegations, but solely on the appropriateness of removal.
Transparency, safeguards and institutional legitimacy
One of the main causes for concern regarding the procedure has been the limited public access to certain key documents. Much of the core documentation in this process — the terms of reference for the OIOS investigation, its detailed findings, and the full report of the ad hoc Panel — remains confidential or has not been published. This lack of transparency has made it difficult to assess externally the legal basis for the decisions taken.
In any disciplinary proceedings involving senior international officials, it is necessary to strike a delicate balance: adequately protecting complainants and potential victims, guaranteeing the rights of defence of the person under investigation, protecting those who report possible irregularities, and ensuring that institutional decisions are sufficiently transparent to preserve public trust.
The very nature of the International Criminal Court demands that its internal accountability mechanisms be exemplary. The legitimacy of an institution created to combat impunity also depends on the credibility of its own internal procedures.
The political and institutional context of the proceedings
The proceedings against the Prosecutor are taking place in a particularly sensitive context due to their timing, which coincides with the investigation into the situation in Palestine.
The first reports of the allegations against Karim Khan emerged in 2024, at a time when the Office of the Prosecutor was preparing applications for arrest warrants relating to the situation in Palestine, including those directed against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the then Defence Minister Yoav Gallant.
Since then, the Court has been subject to intense political pressure linked to its actions regarding Palestine. This pressure includes sanctions against ICC officials, campaigns to discredit the institution, and attacks on individuals and organisations collaborating with the Court’s work.
However, to date, there is no public evidence to suggest that the allegations form part of a coordinated operation with that objective. Linking the two issues without sufficient evidence may undermine both public perception of the allegations of sexual violence and confidence in the institutional mechanisms designed to investigate them.
It has emerged that private intelligence firms based in London spent months gathering sensitive personal information about the whistleblower, her family and other individuals linked to the case — including the Chair and Vice-Chair of the ASP and the Deputy Prosecutor, Nazhat Shameem Khan — in an apparent attempt to link the allegations to Israel, the Mossad or an alleged cover-up. According to the same reports, no evidence of such links was found, and the Dutch authorities have been alerted to this operation; the Dutch police are now investigating possible offences arising from it.
A decision that will shape the institutional development of the ICC
The ICC is, at present, the only permanent international criminal court with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. Its legitimacy depends on its prosecutors and judges being able to carry out their duties independently, without fear of external reprisals or smear campaigns orchestrated to influence their decisions.
Any process to remove a sitting Prosecutor — whatever its outcome — must scrupulously adhere to the Court’s legal framework, with guarantees of due process for both the person under investigation and the institution itself. A Prosecutor removed from office for reasons that do not stand up to rigorous legal scrutiny would set a dangerous precedent: that of an office vulnerable to political pressure from powerful states, precisely when that office is investigating officials from those very same states or their allies. Furthermore, no institution that aspires to administer justice can claim credibility externally if it is unable to listen to, protect and believe those who, from within, report sexual violence, harassment or abuse of power.
These two interests are not at odds with one another. The independence of the Office of the Prosecutor is not safeguarded by shielding those who hold the office from all scrutiny of their personal conduct; on the contrary, it is safeguarded by ensuring that, where serious allegations arise, they are investigated with the same rigour, the same transparency and the same procedural safeguards that the Court requires of States in the cases it adjudicates. And the protection of victims is not achieved by prejudging the outcome of a disciplinary process, but by ensuring that that process — whatever its outcome may be — is conducted without external pressure, without selective leaks and without the victim herself being exposed to public scrutiny that exacerbates the harm already suffered.
What is truly worrying about this process is that the lack of transparency with which it has been conducted has prevented the public, the international legal community and, above all, the complainant herself from verifying that both interests are being effectively protected. Precisely for this reason, the main institutional challenge lies in preventing either of the two processes from being exploited: allegations of misconduct must be examined independently and rigorously, whilst the Court must be able to exercise its jurisdictional functions without external political interference. The protection of both principles is essential to preserving the legitimacy of the Rome Statute system.
The vote by the Assembly of States Parties will not only determine the immediate future of the current Prosecutor. It will also set a precedent regarding how the international community understands the relationship between judicial independence, institutional responsibility and accountability mechanisms within the International Criminal Court.
