The economic situation in Nicaragua under the Ortega-Murillo regime and the repression of peasants and indigenous communities
Nicaragua possesses a wealth of natural resources, notably gold and timber, but its strategic geographical position has also encouraged large-scale projects such as the Nicaragua Canal, with foreign backing – notably from major Chinese investors – and has served as a gateway or transit zone for migrants travelling between South and North America. But how has the Ortega-Murillo regime capitalised on all this?
Mining is one of the regime’s main sources of wealth and sustenance. There are two types: ‘industrial mining’, which is directly controlled by the government, and ‘artisanal’ or small- and medium-scale mining. The former is responsible for the destruction and expropriation of indigenous peoples’ territories; in fact, 66 per cent of the entire Bosawás Biosphere Reserve is under mining concessions (1). The latter operates ‘outside state control’; it is not regulated by the government and is illegal. Nevertheless, it allows the government to carry out a form of money laundering through the illegal gold that circulates, generating wealth through its parallel operation alongside the official market (2), facilitating domestic and international sales of quantities exceeding those theoretically possible and permitted by ‘industrial mining’.
A report by Expediente Público, following complaints lodged with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) regarding illegal extractivism, shows, amongst other things, that illegal gold mining enables production to be increased by more than 30 per cent. To illustrate this, one need only consider the over-export of gold that Nicaragua theoretically and legally produces (3).
Since 2017, the government has authorised a large number of licences for gold extraction through ENIMINAS (Empresa Nicaragüense de Minas), which it has used as an intermediary to create ‘mixed’ companies aimed at the supposed phasing out of ‘artisanal’ or small-scale extractive enterprises, establishing ‘public agreements’ with private sector collaboration to counter this model of mining (according to the Ministry of Energy and Mines’ 2021–2022 Development Plan). In practice, this has resulted in a large number of new mining licences being granted to both public and private entities.
Furthermore, the mining sector is governed by ‘colonialist’ policies, as they seek to displace the inhabitants of the exploited land—indigenous peoples or peasants(4)—by introducing settlers loyal to the regime who maintain control of the area through harsh repression(5). These settlers operate ‘in parallel’ to the government (even though they are entirely local and even authorised), thereby allowing them to ignore both international complaints and those from communities neighbouring the affected areas (6). Nicaraguan indigenous peoples, grouped within the Alliance of Indigenous and Afro-descendant Peoples of Nicaragua, denounced the settlers in their 2020 report (7):
“The Nicaraguan State’s stance on the socio-political crisis that began in 2018 has been similar to that which it has maintained regarding the systematic attacks perpetrated by settlers armed with military-grade weapons, mainly since 2015, against the Mískitu and Mayangna indigenous peoples in the RACCN; in the sense of categorically denying that the events took place, blaming the victims, and discrediting and criminalising the work of those who have raised concerns, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and human rights defenders”.
The management of the mining sector is in the hands of Laureano Ortega-Murillo (8) – the son of the presidential couple – who is said to control most of the commercial dealings with foreign economic powers and their investors.
Although gold is currently the state’s second-largest source of funding, according to the latest figures for the first quarter of 2023, making it one of the regime’s main sources of income (9), mining is not the only activity encroaching on the lands of small farmers and indigenous peoples. The timber industry and livestock farming have also been encroaching on their lands, particularly in the territories along Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast (10). All this is taking place against a backdrop of violence in which more than 70 murders have been reported, potentially constituting the crime of genocide as it is directed against specific populations, such as the country’s indigenous peoples, on the basis of their membership of those groups (11). Furthermore, to the detriment of small farmers’ resources, it is worth noting that the concessions granted to Chinese businesspeople led to numerous and significant protests amongst the peasantry over the expropriation of their land(12).
In 2007, following Ortega’s return to power in 2006, the Nicaraguan executive reached a series of agreements with the Venezuelan government, including one that would lead Nicaragua’s main state-owned oil company, Petronic, to triple its revenue. These decisions were denounced and sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in 2020 for their use in money laundering by the government (more specifically by the presidential family). The agreement was concluded with a Venezuelan company with Nicaraguan shareholdings, ‘Albanisa’
(13), also known as ‘Alba’, which, despite its many activities, has clearly been used to seek the sole direct benefit of the Ortega-Murillo family; these funds have sustained their political measures but are not recorded as state revenue, instead being classified as ‘private’ funds supporting the family regime’s actions (14).
Another of the large-scale projects mentioned earlier was the Nicaragua Canal. This project was intended to compete with the Panama Canal. The main initiative involved granting concessions to foreign investors who were committed to financing the project in order to carry out the work, in exchange for the profits that its construction would generate. Wang Jing, the lead investor, secured the key licences. Subsequently, despite President Ortega’s promises and in the face of limited progress and the project’s eventual stalling, it emerged that this lead investor’s intention was to subcontract or resell the licences granted to him to smaller investors and businesspeople who would take on various roles in the construction. This plan failed to such an extent that it is estimated Wang has lost around two-thirds of his wealth(15). For its part, the government invested millions in the project, which was promised to last five years but ended a decade later without any tangible results (16). However, the licences remain in force and the countless people affected (mainly peasants and indigenous people) continue to be neglected and persecuted.
In light of the above, according to the GHREN report (2024), the persecution of indigenous peoples and the peasant movement is not due to a series of isolated incidents, but rather to a systematic strategy of state repression aimed at eliminating leadership, restricting collective organisation and consolidating the government’s political and economic control, particularly in the territories inhabited by these groups, in order to occupy their lands.
To this end, the report documents arbitrary arrests (such as that of the recently deceased Brooklyn Rivera, an indigenous leader of the YATAMA party who had been detained since 2023 and died last May whilst in the regime’s custody), criminalisation, torture, forced displacement, exile, confiscation of property, the dissolution of organisations, restrictions on movement, violations of territorial rights and a lack of access to justice – all within a context of structural impunity which, according to the Group of Experts, may constitute part of a pattern of crimes against humanity through political persecution.
In short, control over resources and the repression of communities settled in the territories where these resources are located have been key to the material sustenance of the Ortega-Murillo family during their time in the national executive.
By Pedro María Pinilla Rodriguez, a graduate in Law, Political Science and Public Administration and holder of a Master’s degree in Governance and Human Rights from the Autonomous University of Madrid.
This article was selected as part of the Call for Papers by FIBGAR’s ALERTA Latam Observatory, aimed at students on the Master’s in Governance and Human Rights at the Autonomous University of Madrid. We thank the author for his valuable contribution to this forum for analysis and critical reflection on the challenges facing Latin America, and for his commitment to promoting human rights, justice and democracy in the region.
REFERENCES
Oakland Institute. “Nicaragua, a failed revolution”, 2020. Available at: https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/nicaragua-revolucion-fallida-lucha-indigena-saneamiento. Alliance of Indigenous and Afro-descendant Peoples of Nicaragua (APIAN). “Report on the Situation of the Territorial Rights of Indigenous and Afro-descendant Peoples in Nicaragua”, 2017. Available at: https://www.calpi-nicaragua.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Informe-APIAN-Nicaragua-2017-2.pdf
Garnieri, R. (2024) “Where is Nicaragua heading?”
Expediente Público (2023) “Complaint lodged with the IACHR alleging that the Nicaraguan regime promotes illegal mining to finance itself”. https://www.expedientepublico.org/denuncian-ante-la-cidh-que-regimen-de-nicaragua-promueve-mineria-ilegal-para-financiarse/
Those who in the past played a particularly significant role in the quest for peace following the violence that accompanied the fall of the Somoza regime – such as the Miskitu women and mothers (Barbeyto et al, 2021) are now in the crosshairs of a regime that sees them merely as an obstacle to its own economic projects, with no regard for the rights that both the state itself and the international community currently grant to indigenous peoples.
Confidencial (2023) “Settlers forced a child to witness the massacre of indigenous people in Bosawás”. See: https://confidencial.digital/nacion/colonos-obligaron-a-un-nino-a-ver-la-masacre-de-indigenas-en-bosawas/. See also: Law No. 445 – Law on the communal property regime of indigenous peoples and ethnic communities.
Report by the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples and People of African Descent of Nicaragua (APIAN). “Report on the Situation of the Territorial Rights of Indigenous Peoples and People of African Descent in Nicaragua” (2017)
Report by the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples and People of African Descent of Nicaragua (APIAN). “Report on the Situation of the Territorial Rights of Indigenous Peoples and People of African Descent in Nicaragua”, 2018–2020 (2020).
The regime’s main mining companies, ENIMINAS and the MEM, coordinated their actions with ProNicaragua, Nicaragua’s investment and export promotion agency, led by Laureano Ortega Murillo
Ministry of Energy and Mines https://www.mem.gob.ni/?page_id=6911
The Caribbean Coast is an autonomous, multicultural and multi-ethnic region. See Law No. 445 – Law on the communal property regime of indigenous peoples and ethnic communities.
There is a rather racist attitude at the political level towards this region, with the majority of the population living on the opposite coast (the Pacific) (Appendix).
The record of murdered indigenous people has been covered by, amongst other media outlets, El Confidencial (2023): “Genocide with impunity: 70 indigenous people in Nicaragua murdered in the last decade”. Available at: https://confidencial.digital/nacion/genocido-en-impunidad-70-indigenas-de-nicaragua-asesinados-en-la-ultima-decada/
Cortés Ramos, A. (2019). “The Ortega regime. A new family dictatorship on the continent?” Edited by Edmundo Jarquín. Managua: Editorial Pavsa, 2016. Yearbook of Central American Studies, 45, 667–672.
Albanisa is an oil company controlled by Nicaragua (49 per cent) and Venezuela (51 per cent) (Close, D. 2016); the agreement for its creation and collaboration with the company dates back to 2007. It has maintained economic relations with various Nicaraguan companies such as the Caja Rural Nacional (CARUNA), which was also sanctioned by the US Treasury Department four years ago. This institution’s or company’s most international project was the consolidation of an oil network to supply and trade within a core group of Latin American countries such as Nicaragua, Venezuela, Honduras and El Salvador. Its operations were diversified through ‘subsidiaries’ which, however, merely served to conceal the activities of the sole parent company and its financial transactions.
A rough estimate suggests that the funds available from just one of the various cooperation agreements with Venezuela “almost equal the total international aid from the West that Nicaragua receives in a year” (Castillo Argüello, Ricardo. 2008. “The Political Economy of Petrodollars”. Confidencial, 606, 19–25 October, 14)
Book Nicaragua Investiga 1: “The Big Lie to Sell a Third of Nicaragua”
Wünderich, V. (2014). “The new Grand Canal project in Nicaragua: more of a nightmare than a dream”. Encuentro, (97), 24–35.
